Amateur Hour: Is The Ncaa Well Equipped To Protect The Amateur Status Of Student-Athletes? by Bramlett, Andrew
AMATEUR HOUR: IS THE NCAA WELL EQUIPPED TO 
PROTECT THE AMATEUR STATUS OF STUDENT-
ATHLETES? 
 
Andrew Mitchell Bramlett 
 
TC 660H 
Plan II Honors Program 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 15, 2019 
 
 
 
Dr. Michael B. Clement 
Accounting Department Chair, McCombs School of Business 
Supervising Professor 
 
 
 
Dr. James W. Vick 
Professor Emeritus, College of Natural Sciences 
Second Reader 
	 2	
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Author:  Andrew Mitchell Bramlett 
 
Title:    Amateur Hour: Is the NCAA Well Equipped to Protect the Amateur      
Status of Student-Athletes? 
 
Supervising Professor: Dr. Michael B. Clement 
 
Founded in 1906, one of the primary responsibilities of the National Collegiate Athletics 
Association (NCAA) was to protect the amateur status of college athletes. Over the last 
century, the lines have blurred, and in 2019 the NCAA lacks both a consistent definition 
of amateurism and the confidence of the public in their ability to protect it. This thesis 
aims to illuminate how the NCAA is currently working to protect amateurism for young 
athletes, and what options they have in the future to maintain and improve their ability 
to do so. 
 
College athletics is a multi-billion dollar industry, primarily reliant on the labor of 
(effectively) unpaid 18 to 22 year olds. In 1906, the absence of massive athletic-
department paydays prevented many of the complications we see today. Public debate 
over whether the players (particularly in the high-revenue sports of football and 
basketball) should be paid for their efforts has reached an all-time high, and many 
lawsuits filed over the last two decades have questioned whether it is even legal for 
collegiate athletes to not receive payment for their play or likeness. I discuss the key 
takeaways of these debates and legal battles within this thesis. 
 
The NCAA faces other problems as well—inconsistent definition and application of 
amateurism, a threat of new entrants in the market for athletes aged 18 to 22, and 
growing revenues with opposing solutions on how to distribute them all threaten to 
impair the ability of the NCAA to protect young athletes. This thesis will examine the 
impact of each of these dangers to the NCAA. 
 
If the NCAA can make a few important changes, most specifically allowing players to be 
compensated for their likeness up to a reasonable point, it will have maintained a status 
of modified amateurism among college athletes while still compensating people more 
fairly for the value that they create. If the NCAA is unwilling or unable to further adapt 
its definition to protect and advocate for modified amateurism amongst student 
athletes, any amateurism within collegiate athletics may cease to exist. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 When Duke basketball star Zion Williamson stepped through his shoe and 
injured his knee in a February 2019 game against North Carolina, media around the 
country resumed a debate that has been hashed out every few months for all of my life—
should college athletes be paid? Zion Williamson, after all, is worth millions of dollars to 
Duke University, Nike, and dozens of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
officials, but all he sees of that money is in the form of tuition and a small “cost of 
attendance” stipend. Some media members, who point out that most collegiate football 
and basketball players are young black men, have called the system “like slavery”1. It 
does seem a little unfair that someone like Zion, who in the immediate future has no use 
for the one year of classes he will take at Duke before declaring for the NBA draft, 
wouldn’t be compensated in a different way. 
 While this case was not the first instance of this debate (or even the first of 2018-
2019), the case of Zion Williamson perfectly encapsulated many of the different 
elements I had been researching. My research question is as follows: considering the 
environment of college athletics in 2019, particularly the revenues brought in by major 
collegiate football and basketball programs and the increasing availability of other 
options for young athletes, is the NCAA well equipped to protect the amateur nature of 
college athletics or is there an impending change coming?  
																																																								
1 Blackistone, Kevin B. “It's Not Wrong to Say College Sports Is like Slavery. It's Wrong That No One's Trying to Fix That.” The 
Washington Post, WP Company, 8 May 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/its-not-wrong-to-say-college-sports-is-
like-slavery-its-wrong-that-no-ones-trying-to-fix-that/2018/05/08/564b789c-52df-11e8-9c91-
7dab596e8252_story.html?utm_term=.cd35b9c74ebd. 
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 It’s important to remember that, for all of the national debate surrounding this 
issue, the vast majority of college athletes wouldn’t be affected by these changes much at 
all, because only football and basketball bring in enough money and attention to justify 
paying student-athletes. While there are certainly a few college athletes in less “popular” 
sports that could be compensated, that compensation would rarely be worth more than 
the value of a college degree, and often the NCAA provides the highest level of 
competition. This thesis will focus primarily on the ability of the NCAA to protect the 
amateur status of young football and basketball players while improving the lives of all 
student-athletes. There are important lessons to glean from all NCAA sports that are 
relevant to the debate. 
Modes of Research 
 I read a litany of law reviews, case studies, books, and articles. Through these, I 
was able to gauge how legal professionals, historians, and media members felt about the 
history of the NCAA and its operations. I had discussions with current and former 
student-athletes, professors, and media members. Through these pursuits, I was able to 
understand the current and past landscape of college athletics, and how there is 
discontent among many different stakeholders. I looked over different bylaws of the 
NCAA, court cases it had been involved in, and statements that have been made. These 
allowed me to begin to grasp the reasoning behind many of the actions of the NCAA that 
the media and the public find inexplicable, and understand why institutional change has 
been hard to come by or slow moving. The following thesis will show my findings. 
Overview of Contents 
 Chapter 2 will be a discussion of amateurism. The origins of the word are far 
more loaded than many people realize, and the original intention of amateurism was 
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less about protecting young people than it was preserving a system of athletics for the 
upper class2. Through the last 150 years, the definition has changed considerably—what 
was once $15 per month for laundry money eventually became illegal, and then returned 
in the form of a $2,000-$6,0003 full cost of attendance stipend. In the meantime, 
Western society’s desire for amateurism has waned. Both the Olympics and the NCAA 
made their commitment to amateurism within ten years of each other, and yet the 
International Olympic Committee hasn’t required its athletes to carry the amateur 
status in over thirty years4. The NCAA, on the other hand, was much more willing to 
alter their definition of amateurism over time, yet remains unwilling to eliminate it. The 
NCAA is fighting the popular culture in the battle to protect what can only be described 
as the modified amateur system that they have maintained for over six decades. I also 
use this chapter to determine how to define amateurism 
 As I will discuss at length in Chapter 3, one of the primary reasons for the 
founding of the NCAA was to protect the amateurism of college athletes. I aim to use 
this chapter to present and explain the different phases of the NCAA. Once highly 
concerned with making sure that no collegiate athlete, regardless of their financial need, 
even received a scholarship, the NCAA has a rich history of adapting to some elements 
of the culture while fighting back on other pressures. Legal precedent set throughout the 
113-year history of the NCAA is vital to a clear understanding of the operations of the 
NCAA in 2019, and Chapter 3 will explore some new challenges facing the NCAA in their 
effort to protect amateurism.  																																																								
2 Ancient Olympics, 2012, ancientolympics.arts.kuleuven.be/eng/TE016EN.html. 
 
3 Smith, Christopher. “Full Cost of Attendance: What Will It Mean for Power Five Players?” Saturday Down South, SEC, 10 Apr. 
2015, www.saturdaydownsouth.com/sec-football/full-cost-of-attendance-explained/. 
 
4 Jennings, L.A. “For Love or For Money: A History of Amateurism in the Olympic Games.” Vice, VICE, 7 June 2016, 
www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvaqdm/for-love-or-for-money-a-history-of-amateurism-in-the-olympic-games. 
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 Chapter 4 will begin to address the threats to the NCAA in its current form, 
beginning with new entrants to the market of athletes aged 18 to 22. Whether it is 
European or G-League basketball, new professional football leagues with different 
regulations on who can and cannot participate, or even different types of sports 
altogether, the NCAA is facing different competitors in convincing athletes to play for 
their member institutions. This threat has never been higher than it is today, and will 
only continue to grow as the potential revenue generated by these athletes grows. 
 Chapter 5 centers on a discussion of the growing TV revenues, particularly in 
collegiate football and basketball. Live sports are one of the most valuable properties for 
television broadcast companies to obtain5, and both the NCAA and its member 
institutions have been able to capitalize on this over the last decade or more. The 
distribution of these revenues causes some problems by misaligning incentives for 
schools of different size: Chapter 5 will dive into how these misaligned incentives could 
spell trouble for the NCAA. If the NCAA successfully realigns incentives for both large 
and small schools, the “pie” (amount of revenue distributed) will grow for all member 
institutions while amateurism is still protected. If handled poorly, the amount of money 
at stake could cause certain programs to decide to split from the NCAA and form their 
own league with the intent of creating more revenue for their schools. 
 Chapter 6 is a discussion of the societal pressure to compensate players for their 
likeness, and the viability of this option for the future of the NCAA. First brought to the 
national media by a lawsuit in 2009, the ability for a player to profit off of their likeness 
may be the modification that needs to be made to continue to preserve modified 
																																																								
5 James, Meg. “The Rise of Sports TV Costs and Why Your Cable Bill Keeps Going Up.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 5 
Dec. 2016, www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-sports-channels-20161128-story.html. 
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amateurism while allowing players to be more fairly compensated. However, the NCAA 
will be hard pressed to find a way to do this that doesn’t open Pandora’s box and create a 
system that is more comparable to a free-agent market in professional sports, where 
teams can bid on players coming out of high school without an upper limit. 
Understanding why the NCAA fought so hard against the 2009 O’Bannon lawsuit, and 
determining if they were correct to do so, is the main focus of this chapter. 
  Finally, Chapter 7 will be the conclusions and recommendations that I would 
make to the NCAA. My research has led me to believe that, contrary to the belief of 
much of the national media, the NCAA has found different ways to adapt its definition of 
amateurism in order to protect some of the character that was originally intended in 
collegiate sports. If the NCAA can make a few important changes, most specifically 
allowing players to be compensated for their likeness up to a reasonable point, it will 
have maintained a status of modified amateurism among college athletes while still 
compensating people more fairly for the value that they create. 
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Chapter 2 
The Ever-Changing Definition of Amateurism 
 
 Many people believe that the definition of amateurism in the way that we know it 
today originally stems from Greeks competing in the Olympics. This is not the case—in 
fact, the earliest usage of the word amateur that resembles the definition that we have 
today is from the late eighteenth century. The word is derived from the Latin word 
amator, which means lover6. It then became the French word amateur, and was later 
adopted into English. Even today, it has three primary meanings, only one of which is 
important to this thesis. It is defined as “one who engages in a pursuit, study, science, or 
sport as a pastime rather than as a profession.” This use of the word originated in the 
nineteenth century, in both England and the United States. The word was heavily 
associated with class, rather than skill—an athlete from the upper class played sports as 
a pastime, and made their money in other ways. A professional was an athlete from a 
lower class, who had to be paid to play his sport (lacking another way to bring in an 
income). In fact, at the 1878 Henley Regatta, the rules stated, “no person shall be 
considered an amateur oarsmen or sculler who is or has been by trade or employment 
for wages, a mechanic, artisan, or laborer.”7 Being an amateur athlete required that one 
be a member of the upper class. 
 It follows, then, only an industrialized society with different classes of people 
would even have a use for the modern concept of amateurism. There simply was not 																																																								
6 “Amateur.” Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amateur. 
 
7 Same as footnote #4. 
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enough time in most earlier societies to leisurely play games during the daylight hours, 
and an even less of an option for people to sacrifice something of value to come watch 
the athletes participate. There are a few examples from earlier societies that may have 
led to something similar to amateurism, but no records indicate that any of these 
societies did. 
Athletes in Past Societies 
The Greek Olympics 
 Because of the modern Olympics that long required the athletes to be amateurs, 
many people believe that the word (or one with the same meaning) was used to describe 
ancient athletes who participated in the original games. This is not the case—the Ancient 
Olympics were never longer than five days, and were only one or three days for much of 
their history8. The rest of the year, the athletes who competed in the events were 
required to do other things to contribute to their families or cities, lacking both the time 
and the audience to perform professionally year round. These athletes did “engage in the 
pursuit as a pastime rather than a profession”, and therefore do fit the definition of 
amateurism—but this wasn’t out of a sense of obligation, but rather necessity. There 
were members of different royal families who participated in the Olympic games (most 
famously, Alexander I)9, and were likely able to train with much more rigor than the 
other participants, never needing to work in the field.  
 
 																																																								
8 “Ancient Olympic Sports - Running, Long Jump, Discus, Pankration.” International Olympic Committee, 20 Dec. 2018, 
www.olympic.org/ancient-olympic-games/the-sports-events. 
 
9 “Ancient Olympic Athletes - Leonidas, Melankomas, Milon.” International Olympic Committee, 20 Dec. 2018, 
www.olympic.org/ancient-olympic-games/the-athlete. 
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Roman Gladiators and Chariot Races 
  Roman society had professional “athletes” in a way that Greek society never did. 
Gladiators, professional Roman fighters tasked to entertain audiences, were 
compensated for their work entertaining people. They also fought at the risk of death, 
and the entertainment sometimes involved them killing convicted criminals, slaves, or 
wild animals. The closest sport to a gladiator fight that exists today is likely boxing or 
the UFC (Ultimate Fighting Championship), and there are parallels that can certainly be 
drawn between the two. However, there were no “amateur” gladiators—if non-
professional gladiators wanted to fight each other, it wouldn’t have been considered a 
sport. If they wanted to try to kill a wild animal, the animal wouldn’t be placed in a 
stadium first—they would simply be hunting it. 
 Roman society also amplified the (originally Greek) sport of chariot racing. 
Chariot races were routinely performed at traveling circuses throughout the empire10. In 
this case, the chariot racers were compensated as entertainers (employees of the circus), 
similar to how a NASCAR driver would be today. However, because of the high cost of 
both time and capital to become involved in chariot racing, there are no records of 
leagues of amateur chariot races throughout Ancient Rome. 
Amateurism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 
 Amateurism, then, was a term for the upper class to use to describe their athletic 
pursuits. In the nineteenth century, American upper class young men in the north east 
often went to University after attending prep school, and so it makes sense that the term 
would’ve been so important to schools like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. The founding 
																																																								
10 “Chariot Racing in Ancient Rome - The History, Fans and Facts.” The Great Courses Daily, 6 Mar. 2019, 
www.thegreatcoursesdaily.com/chariot-racing/. 
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of the NCAA will be discussed at length in the next chapter, but before the NCAA, 
amateurism was not a requirement of an intercollegiate athlete. Beginning with the 
NCAA (or at the time, the IAAUS) in 1906, that changed, and both the Olympics and 
intercollegiate sports adopted rules that required participants to be amateurs in 1896 
and 1906, respectively. It is quite possible that this was to restrict participation in these 
sports to the upper class, whose members around the world wrote the rulebooks. 
 The International Olympic Committee (IOC) was famously fervent about the 
rules of amateurism. Famous American Athlete Jim Thorpe won two gold medals at the 
1912 Olympic games. Decades later, the IOC found out that Thorpe had played minor 
league baseball for a few weeks in the summer of 1909 for grocery money. His medals 
were stripped, and not recognized until after Thorpe’s death11. Importantly, Thorpe was 
a poor Native American, and didn’t fit the mold of many Olympians less than twenty 
years after they were revived.  In the true spirit of “amateurism” at the time, Thorpe’s 
lower socioeconomic status did, in many ways, prevent him from competing in the 
Olympics. 
Olympic Rule Changes  
 This rule in the Olympics persisted until 1988, when the IOC allowed all 
professional athletes eligible for participation in the Olympic games. Famously, this 
allowed for Michael Jordan and the “Dream Team” to compete in the 1992 Olympic 
Basketball tournament, which has become one of the most famous American moments 
at the Olympics. Prior to the rule change, college athletes would sometimes compete in 
the different events, before becoming professionals. The most notable example of this is 
																																																								
11 Jenkins, Sally. “Why Are Jim Thorpe's Olympic Records Still Not Recognized?” Smithsonian.com, Smithsonian Institution, 1 July 
2012, www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-are-jim-thorpes-olympic-records-still-not-recognized-130986336/. 
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the 1980 U.S. hockey team, who defeated powerhouse Russia to advance to the Gold 
Medal game, which they would later win. I think that there is a poetic justice to the fact 
that the two most well known Olympic achievements in American history came from a 
group of college amateurs and a group of adult professionals, only 12 years apart. It 
indicates that, while many on both sides of the argument believe that the other side is 
wholly incorrect, most people love to see their country (or their school, their city, or 
their state) win the athletic competition, regardless of whether the athletes are being 
paid or not. 
The Definition of Amateurism in the NCAA Today 
 In the next chapter, we will dive deep into the modifications that have been made 
over the last 113 years to the definition of amateurism that have considerably modified 
the original intent. There is no argument that college sports are only supposed to be 
played by the upper class anymore—if anything, the more common argument goes that 
the upper class benefits financially on the backs of the lower class athletes doing all of 
the work. There are a few important individual cases to examine regarding a college 
athlete’s amateur status to compare to what amateurism looked like over 100 years ago. 
Joseph Schooling and the “Minor” Sports 
 The Olympic Committee of Singapore paid Joseph Schooling, a swimmer at UT 
Austin, over $700,000 for his gold-medal performance in the Olympics in 2016.12 In 
2017 and 2018, Schooling continued to compete as an amateur swimmer in the NCAA 
championships, leading UT to two more national titles. Mark Emmert, the president of 
the NCAA, raised concerns about this situation, but it is consistent with the 
																																																								
12 Solomon, Jon. “NCAA Prez Concerned by Texas Swimmer Paid $740K for Winning Olympic Gold.” CBSSports.com, 9 Sept. 2016, 
www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-president-concerned-by-texas-swimmer-paid-740000-for-winning-olympic-gold/. 
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implementation of the rules over the last few decades. The problem that the NCAA has 
run into is a cultural one—the backlash against the NCAA would be tremendous if they 
denied an athlete like Schooling, who bested Michael Phelps in a race, the opportunity 
to continue competing in his sport. Because both collegiate and professional swimming 
are not as nationally relevant, the NCAA can easily slide by unnoticed by allowing 
athletes to compete as amateurs who, by any definition, are not amateurs. This indicates 
that, in 2019, there are instances where the NCAA is more concerned with the public 
opinion of the institution than they are with protecting amateurism. After all, one of the 
original justifications for amateurism was that “fair play and good sportsmanship are 
possible only when sports are an athlete's avocation, never his or her vocation."13 Joseph 
Schooling, a talented enough swimmer to defeat Michael Phelps and earn $700,000 
from his home country, cannot reasonably compete fairly against an amateur swimmer. 
But what are Emmert and the NCAA to do? 
Kyler Murray and the Two-Sport Athlete 
 Kyler Murray, standout football and baseball player for Oklahoma University, 
received nearly $5,000,000 as a signing bonus after the Major League Baseball draft in 
the summer of 201814—in the fall of 2018, he led the football team at OU to a 12-1 record 
and won the Heisman Trophy, clearly maintaining his amateur status. While Kyler had 
never played professional football before (and was disqualified from playing NCAA 
baseball after he took the signing bonus), calling him an “amateur athlete” who 
competes in sports only for the enjoyment and not for the money is disingenuous. 
Compare two-sport athlete Kyler Murray, allowed to accept nearly $5 million dollars for 																																																								
13 Same as footnote #4 
 
14 “Source: A's, Murray Nearing $5 Million Bonus.” MLB.com, www.mlb.com/news/a-s-kyler-murray-agree-to-5-million-bonus-
c280111876. 
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one sport while maintaining his amateur status in another, with two-sport athlete Jim 
Thorpe, whose decision to take grocery money for barely-organized baseball games 
prohibited him from competing as an amateur decathlete on the world stage. This is 
maybe the starkest example of how the definition has changed in the last century. There 
is no element of discrimination against those in the lower class, but there are also very 
relaxed requirements for someone to be considered an “amateur athlete” as the athlete 
is reclassified as an amateur for each specific athletic endeavor.  
Recruiting Athletes 
 Under the original system of amateurism that the NCAA established, recruiting 
young men and women to play for your school was against the rules (again, we will dive 
deeper into this in the third chapter).15 This is no longer the case, and almost all major 
athletic departments have the ability to get students into their schools that would not 
otherwise be accepted. In fact, this turned to scandal in the spring of 2019, as it was 
revealed that some rich parents across the country had paid different “consultants” to 
help grease the wheels and convince college coaches to put different athletes on the 
admissions list for major universities including the University of Southern California, 
the University of Texas, and Yale University.16 Lists like these are very common 
throughout the country—prospective athletes who are being recruited by sports teams 
from tennis to football are put on lists by coaches. These lists are given to admissions 
officers, who then look to green light these students based on lower qualifications than a 
normal applicant. This clearly indicates that the value of a degree from a prominent 
																																																								
15 Muenzen, Kristen R. “Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA's Version of Amateurism.” Marquette Sports Law Review, vol. 13, 
no. 2, pp. 257–288. 
 
16 The New York Times. “College Admissions Scandal: Your Questions Answered.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 14 
Mar. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/college-admissions-scandal-questions.html. 
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University is compensation, desired by people to the point of breaking the law. If the 
degree is worth a grease payment of a million dollars or more, then the compensation 
that the athlete is receiving could certainly be considered enough to no longer call them 
an amateur athlete, playing only for the love of the game. 
Consistency Is Key 
 Judge Claudia Wilken, who presided over the well-known O’Bannon vs. NCAA 
case (discussed in depth in Chapter 6), said of the NCAA, “The association’s current 
rules demonstrate that, even today, the NCAA does not necessarily adhere to a single 
definition of amateurism.”17 For the sake of the debate over whether the NCAA can 
protect amateurism, I think is important to recognize that the definition has changed. 
The original inspiration for the word was to separate the upper and lower classes, which 
is no longer a goal of the Olympics or the NCAA (of course, only the NCAA still requires 
that an athlete be an “amateur’). Societal pressure to allow young athletes opportunities 
has changed the way that the NCAA wants to police amateurism, and the NCAA has 
determined that a professional tennis player can still be an amateur golfer. Most 
importantly, they have modified their definition of amateurism to allow for a 
scholarship to a university of the athlete’s choosing. Therefore, for the sake of this 
paper, I hope to determine if the NCAA has the ability to prevent a system akin to free 
agency (like that in many professional sports) or a “salary” for players. If they are able to 
preserve what we currently consider amateurism, or a system that closely resembles it, 
the NCAA has accomplished its goal. The following chapter on the history of the NCAA 
																																																								
17 Solomon, Jon. “The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes.” The Aspen Institute, 24 May 2018, 
www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/. 
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will examine different ways that the NCAA has applied their changing definitions of 
amateurism, but these changes are not a failure in and of themselves. 
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Chapter 3 
The History of the NCAA 
 
When examining the NCAA in 2019, it is vital to understand the foundation of the 
institution. Through bylaws, statements, and court precedents spanning over 100 years, 
there is a fair amount of information in the public domain regarding the NCAA. From its 
founding to its status as a billion-dollar behemoth that affects hundreds of thousands of 
lives annually, the NCAA has been better at responding to changes in culture than 
people often give it credit for. This chapter will dive into why the NCAA was founded, 
what changes have been made throughout its one hundred and thirteen year history, 
and how the history of the organization is affecting its behavior today. 
College Athletics Before the NCAA 
 Intercollegiate athletics began long before the NCAA was founded, but there were 
some key differences between now and then. Yale and Harvard competed in a rowing 
match in 1852, which is the first recognized intercollegiate athletic event. Some 
elements of this competition can still be seen today—young men competing in a sport, 
hoping to “test the superiority of the oarsmen of the two colleges.” Harvard won the 
competition (and therefore the bragging rights) and collegiate athletics was born.18 A few 
decades later, after much debate on the rules, college football began in the same region, 
with both Harvard and Yale being major powerhouses in the early days of the sport. The 
rivalries were regional, just as they are today, and the bragging rights were highly 
coveted.  
																																																								
18 Shiff, Blair. “The History behind America's Oldest Active Collegiate Sporting Event.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 9 June 2017, 
abcnews.go.com/Sports/history-americas-oldest-active-collegiate-sporting-event/story?id=47852376. 
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Lack of Amateurism 
As college athletics expanded throughout the country, it was common to find 
schools hiring players to compete in their athletic events who were not students at the 
school.19 In the absence of a governing body, there were no rules as to who could or could 
not compete in matches, and even in the late 1800s, schools, players, and alumni were 
interested enough in beating their rivals that they showed a willingness to pay for a 
victory. This complete lack of amateurism (or even attempt to have it) is a very key 
difference between college athletics before and after the founding of the NCAA. It clearly 
violates the spirit of the game to pay athletes with no affiliation to the school to compete 
in its jersey, and a desire for amateurism was one of the reasons that the NCAA was 
founded. 
Rule Inconsistency 
Walter Camp, one of the most famous and prolific football players of the first 
half-century of football (and honored with the title “The Father of American Football”), 
was actually a medical school dropout who stuck around Yale and played football for 6 
years.20 For decades, Camp constantly rewrote and reformulated the rules of American 
football, hoping to make the games safer, fairer, and more entertaining. There was no 
governing body regulating the entire country, and often the home team would simply 
decide the rules of the game that they would be playing. This lack of consistency across 
the sport became an issue that threatened to inhibit the growth of the sport, and there 
were consistency problems in more collegiate sports than just football. The desire for a 
																																																								
19 Gurney, Gerald Sherman, et al. Unwinding Madness: What Went Wrong with College Sports - and How to Fix It. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2017. 
 
20 Weinreb, Michael. “The All-American Sport: Walter Camp's Vision for Football...” The Athletic, The Athletic, 13 Feb. 2019, 
theathletic.com/810309/2019/02/11/college-football-1880s-walter-camp-rules-first-all-america-team/. 
 
	 21	
more consistent on-field product, governed by a national group, was another key factor 
in the call for the formation of the NCAA. 
Danger to Student-athletes 
No element of collegiate athletics was more important to the founding of the 
NCAA than the danger that was posed to different athletes. Through the 1890s, many of 
the rule changes that took place in football specifically were made to lower the death toll 
of football. John Heisman, Walter Camp, and Pop Warner, all still venerated today as 
instrumental to the game of American football (and specifically, the game for college 
aged men and younger) were a huge part of instituting the forward pass as legal, often 
citing pressure from the society at the time regarding rising death tolls. Harvard 
president Charles Eliot was one of the strongest critics of collegiate football, and there 
was no single body that was able to unilaterally change the rules or defend football as a 
sport.21 According to different New York Times reports, over 20 college football players 
died on the field each year between 1890-1892. While Camp was able to stem the tide of 
calls to ban American football with well-timed rules changes, danger to college athletes 
(highlighted by the death of 18 football players 1905) was a major factor in President 
Theodore Roosevelt calling for a meeting.22 
Founding of the NCAA 
 Like we so often see today, the founding of the NCAA stemmed from a discussion 
surrounding college football. President Teddy Roosevelt, a huge football fan himself, 
heard calls from around the country to ban the sport. He called a meeting in the fall of 																																																								
21 Weinreb, Michael. “The First Forward Passes: In a Decade of Change, Eddie...” The Athletic, The Athletic, 11 Mar. 2019, 
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1905 with coaches and advisers from Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, with the goal of 
improving football. Roosevelt’s son had been severely injured playing for Harvard, so he 
was personally invested in improving the safety of young football players. These 
meetings drastically changed the future of collegiate athletics: while the immediate rules 
change allowed the forward pass (and, in doing so, fundamentally changed the sport to 
be similar to what it has become today), they also needed a governing body to form and 
enforce new regulations. In 1906, sixty-two colleges formed the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States (IAAUS). This organization is the original form of the 
NCAA, and it would change its name in 1910.23 
 The stated purpose upon the founding of the NCAA was to protect student-
athletes from the “dangerous and exploitative athletics practices of the time.”24 Early on, 
the NCAA played a minimally intrusive role. The NCAA had established bylaws that it 
relied on the member institutions to establish. There were no NCAA championships, 
and with only sixty-two member schools to begin with, there were many colleges that 
had no relationship with the NCAA (this is important only because it provides a 
historical basis for an NCAA to exist without all major institutions being a part of it). 
Amateurism Early in the NCAA 
 Amateurism was one of the most important principles of the young NCAA. As 
discussed earlier, it was illegal at the time to even give a student-athlete a scholarship to 
incentivize them to come to your school and play for you, and it would remain illegal 
until 1956. As we noted, this was a drastic change from the pre-NCAA years, when 
schools would often hire athletes with no affiliation to the school to play in the games. 																																																								
23 Same as Footnote #15. 
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There are clear accounts of how amateurism was defined in the first ten years of the 
NCAA: “financial inducements from any source, including the faculty or university 
financial aid committees, were not allowed. Singling out prominent athletic students 
from preparatory schools is a violation of the amateur code, as was playing those who 
are not bona fide students.”25 Take both elements of that definition in to account—not 
only are scholarships illegal for athletes who were literally putting their lives on the line, 
but recruiting was not allowed either. A student who wished to play collegiate athletics 
would have to be admitted to the school purely on their academic merit, and would then 
have to try out for the team, without any coercion from the school. If they were able to 
make the team, there would be no compensation of any kind, regardless of their 
academic need.  
In 1916, the by-laws were cleared up additionally, stating that an “amateur” is 
“one who participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and the 
physical, mental, moral, and social benefits derived directly therefrom.”26 This was a 
guiding principle for the NCAA for nearly half of a century after its founding, and there 
is a strong argument to be made that this is the only time the NCAA has ever operated 
under “true” amateurism. Of course, there is speculation (and some confirmation) that 
just as is the case today, there were alumni, booster groups, and even athletic 
departments that would make under-the-table payments to athletes to ensure that they 
would choose the right school. The NCAA’s ability to regulate, especially early on, was 
very poor—as stated above, the NCAA relied heavily on member institutions to self-
police. While this remains the case, the NCAA (and even the FBI) makes much more of 
an effort to prevent these payments now. 																																																								
25 Same as Footnote #15 
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Evolution of Scholarships 
Legal Need-Based Aid 
 In 1948, the NCAA made their first effort to slightly modify their stringent 
requirements for amateur athletes. This is known as the “Sanity Code”, and is the first 
time that college athletes were allowed to receive any form of compensation from their 
University and still play college sports. Under this change, students could receive a 
scholarship for their tuition and fees if they demonstrated financial need and met the 
normal admissions requirements of the school.27 This change is jarring from the 
perspective of a reader in 2019—it makes it abundantly clear that, for the first 42 years 
of the NCAA, even student-athletes who were too poor to pay for classes were not 
allowed to receive scholarships from their school, even if they excelled academically and 
demonstrated their true need. This reinforces the idea that “amateurism” in the NCAA 
was originally intended just as much as a way to keep the lower class out of collegiate 
athletics as it was to protect young athletes. This provision also made sure to specially 
note that the scholarship could not apply to room and board, but only to college tuition. 
At a time when college tuition was, in many places, under $100 per semester, this was 
an almost nonexistent amount of compensation for athletes who created, even at the 
time, a lot of value for their schools. For reference, a highly paid NFL player at the time 
would make $13,000 per semester, or approximately 520 times what a California 
resident would pay in a tuition fee at the University of California Berkeley.28  While this 
was the practice in place, there was no change in the consistency that people would 
illegally pay student-athletes. 																																																								
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A More Modern Scholarship 
 In 1956, the NCAA decided to change the rules once again, with the purpose of 
stopping these payments from boosters and alumni. At that time, they voted to “allow 
full grants-in-aid,” which included tuition, fees, room and board, books, and even a $15 
per month laundry stipend.29 This is much closer to the system we have today, and was 
the last major change before 2015. What the NCAA was unable to do with this change 
was alter the amount of money that booster clubs had—they simply increased the 
compensation that would be allowed to student-athletes. With that in mind, it’s no 
surprise that booster clubs continued using illegal payments to entice students to attend 
their school, a problem that has persisted until today (and helps drive the national 
conversation regarding the NCAA). 
 These two changes, made in 1948 and 1956, forever altered the fabric of collegiate 
athletics. From 1906 until 1956, there was absolutely no benefit (that could be given 
legally) to a student-athlete to play a sport. When this changed in 1956, and there was 
now an exchange of value for a student deciding to represent a school athletically, they 
no longer fit the truest definition of amateurism. Ever since 1956, it can be said that the 
NCAA operates under a “modified amateurism”, as discussed earlier. The NCAA proved, 
fifty years after its creation that it was willing to fundamentally change the way that 
student-athletes were treated, largely because they hoped to stop illegal advantages 
gained by teams whose boosters had bigger checkbooks. This was not the best reason to 
fundamentally change their organization, as evidenced by the fact that the changes they 
made had a very minimal impact (if any) on how boosters behaved. In fact, you could 
make an argument that it became worse after 1956—young people in preparatory 																																																								
29 Same as Footnote #15 
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schools had more incentive to play sports (in order to go to college for free), so sports 
became more important for young people, which led to prices going up for the most in-
demand athletes. 
Mixed Motivations 
 The better motivation for change to the NCAA could instead be found in the 
inspiration for its formation—the desire to protect student-athletes. The NCAA has 
always been much better at handling 18- to 22-year olds than it has graduates of its 
member institutions, and a desire to protect student-athletes is what led to rule changes 
across generations that have quite literally saved lives. If the NCAA had hoped to 
preserve the amateur status of athletes, then introducing a system that fundamentally 
changed how they defined amateurism (particularly the change in 1956, that did not 
require financial need or academic prowess to be exhibited) was not necessarily the 
right way to do so. While it seems impossible to believe that a system could exist in 2019 
that didn’t allow student-athletes to even receive scholarships for their performance, the 
motivation behind the changes was imperfect, and the NCAA should learn from their 
mistakes going forward, and not simply change their rules for the sole purpose of 
preventing illegal payments or media backlash. While these two considerations will 
likely influence any future changes, the driving force behind successful reform must 
come from a desire to protect (or improve) the lives of student-athletes. 
Cost of Living 
 Beginning in 1956, the NCAA has had a varying level of willingness to pay 
students a true cost of attending the university—hence the “laundry money” allowed to 
each player beginning with the first legal athletic scholarships. However, in the years 
between 1956 and 2015, the cost of going to college went up, and the cost of attendance 
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compensation waned. Additionally, the “laundry money” was only allowed for 16 years, 
and in 1972 the compensation package removed this (already miniscule) “attendance 
stipend”.30 By 2011, the national conversation again was pushing the NCAA to up the 
compensation for athletes, with dozens of stories each year about student-athletes who 
couldn’t have jobs and weren’t able to even travel home for the holidays because their 
families didn’t have the money for a plane or bus ticket. 
 This change manifested itself in a $2,000 annual stipend, approved by Mark 
Emmert, the president of the NCAA. Emmert noted that, “They [the stipends] were 
adopted in a very clear effort to support our students, and I think, in the end, they will 
do that.”31 Unfortunately, Emmert did not foresee the override option being exercised, 
where 125 member institutions could block the legislation until it could be considered a 
few months later at the annual NCAA convention.32 Some students, who signed National 
Letters of Intent in the two months between the legislation passing and the override, 
were able to receive the stipend, but it was put on debate at the 2012 convention. 
Emmert remained confident that the stipend would pass in its current form at the 
convention, but the vote was delayed again. Eventually, after a complicated, multi-year 
process, it was decided that beginning in 2015, student-athletes would be able to receive 
this additional stipend (further modifying the definition of amateurism that the NCAA 
abides by), and that the stipend would be variable based on where the student-athlete 
attends school. There are a few variables that go into this equation—cost of essential 
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items in the area, cost of travelling to an area (for example, because it is harder to get to 
College Station, Texas than it is to get to Austin, Texas, the student-athletes at Texas 
A&M University get a higher stipend than those that attend UT Austin).33 This proposal 
was similar to the one propose by the Big Ten Conference, and was supported by 
President Emmert, who saw this as an even better solution than the one originally 
passed by the board in 2011.34 
The Legality of TV Revenue 
 There have been many court cases involving the NCAA, and specifically regarding 
the amateur status of NCAA athletes, over the years. The most important of these cases 
in setting the precedent for how the NCAA currently operates was brought to the 
Supreme Court, and stemmed from an argument over the revenues that schools could 
capture from television rights to broadcasting college football games. The danger that 
this continues to pose to the NCAA will be discussed at length later in this paper. Walter 
Byers, who had served as the Executive Director of the NCAA for nearly 35 years at the 
time, implemented a plan that would limit the number of college football games that 
could be televised. He believed that all college football games being broadcast on TV 
would hurt in-game attendance, and at the time it was more profitable for the member 
institutions to sell tickets to the games than to have their games broadcast on TV. After 
all, only a few teams were big enough to have their games nationally broadcast, and the 
compensation that institutions received was miniscule relative to today’s multi-billion 
dollar rights deals. Oklahoma University’s Board of Regents felt that this was anti-
competitive, and the court sided with the OU Board of Regents. The decision included 																																																								
33 Same as Footnote #3 
34 Johnson, Dennis A, and John Acquaviva. “Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes.” The Sport Journal, 31 Jan. 2015, 
thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying-college-athletes/. 
 
	 29	
that “by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to 
consumer preferences, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of 
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life”. 35 
“The Character and Quality of the Product” 
While this was a hugely important decision that helped pave the road for current 
NCAA TV contracts that have blurred the lines of amateurism, there is a second line in 
the decision that has had potentially an even more profound effect on the way the NCAA 
has chosen to defend amateurism over the last thirty-five years. According to the 
majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, “in order to preserve the character and 
quality of the product, athletes must not be paid.”36 While this was not at all the main 
element of the lawsuit, the precedent that it set for the NCAA going forward was 
sweeping. In future Supreme Court cases, including the O’Bannon lawsuit (discussed at 
length in Chapter 6), the NCAA would use this line to justify why players couldn’t be 
compensated for, among other things, their likeness. The Supreme Court wasn’t totally 
off-base in their diagnosis in 1984—schools with more money, alumni, and national 
recognition, especially in the early days of nationally televised college football, would be 
at a huge com37petitive advantage if players could be paid any amount in a system akin to 
free agency in professional sports. However, there are elements of the game today that 
indicate that the Supreme Court’s ideals have not been properly carried out since the 
1984 decision, and the “product” that they sought to preserve has changed considerably. 
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In the nearly thirty-five years since this decision, TV rights deals have grown 
exponentially. What a network was asked to pay for an entire season of college football 
games in 1984 is less than 1/23rd of what CBS now pays annually for the rights to 
broadcast the NCAA Basketball Championship (March Madness) tournament in 2019 
alone. The three games of the college football playoff are worth over fourteen times what 
the original college football season-long deals were worth—this is to say, the product has 
commercialized more than the Supreme Court would’ve expected. Additionally, the 
NCAA has allowed for a natural stratification between the “haves” and the “have-not’s”—
what used to be NCAA Division I was split into NCAA Division I A and I AA, which later 
became FBS and FCS. The FBS was then split into “Power Five” and “Group of 5” 
conferences, even further developing the “haves” receiving more money than the “have-
not’s” (because the rights to the Power 5 conference television broadcast are worth 
much more money, and the member schools of the conferences get to split the money 
obtained for the rights). Conferences like the SEC and individual schools like UT Austin 
make more money on their own deals than the Pac 12 or schools like Illinois. In many 
ways, the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the unlimited broadcast of TV rights of 
intercollegiate athletic events, while having the goal of increased competition in mind, 
ended up stratifying the major NCAA sports even more. 
Key Takeaways From 113 Years of the NCAA 
 Through 113 years, the NCAA still exhibits two of its founding principles—a desire 
to protect student-athletes, and a dedication to keep amateurism alive in college sports. 
The definition of amateurism, however, has changed considerably from a more classic 
definition to a modified one, particularly with the changes made to student-athlete 
compensation in 1956 and 2015. While national conversation seems to have driven these 
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changes, the stated goals of preventing illegal payments and fairly compensating 
athletes for the value they created were not met. When making key changes to their 
structure, it is important that the NCAA remember their original goal of protecting 
student-athletes. 
 An incredibly important part of the history of the NCAA is the revenue growth it 
has experienced over the last 113 years. For many decades, there was almost no revenue 
for the NCAA. Without television broadcast rights, the NCAA had very few streams of 
revenue. The majority of NCAA revenue comes from selling the TV rights to the March 
Madness tournament, and the growth for those rights has grown from less than $9 
million in 1980, over $270 million in 2002, and over $820 million in 2018. This revenue 
growth has added an element of controversy to the NCAA—in 1980, there was far less of 
a reason to call for players to be compensated for the $9 million that they created. When 
the players created nearly one hundred times of that value in 2018, the calls were much 
louder. 
 Much of the legal precedent used by the NCAA stems from one case from 1984 
that went all the way to the Supreme Court, and has two major takeaways to the current 
operations of the NCAA. First, the rights to broadcast games cannot be restricted by the 
NCAA. While this was originally done to increase competition, it hasn’t exactly done so. 
The other important note was that the Supreme Court specifically stated that student-
athletes could not be paid in order to preserve both the “character and quality” of the 
games, a precedent that the NCAA has continued to lean on. The irony of this, of course, 
is that the same statement could’ve been made before 1948 regarding scholarships—“in 
order to preserve the character of a sport where students who attend a school compete 
against each other athletically, we cannot recruit and compensate those players.” The 
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NCAA clearly did not hold that opinion. The argument could’ve been made against a 
cost of living stipend prior to 2015—the “character” of amateur collegiate sports requires 
that students not be compensated—until it doesn’t. What the NCAA has shown 
throughout the years is that, with substantial national pressure and questionable legal 
precedent, they are not opposed to modifying their definition of amateurism. This is the 
most important takeaway for the future of the NCAA. Understanding the definition of 
amateurism and the history of the NCAA is vital to a discussion of the threats that could 
be posed by new entrants, like the ones that we will discuss in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
New Players 
 
 Part of the reason the NCAA has been able to survive for so long with very few 
periods of rapid transition comes down to, in many ways, the lack of availability of other 
options for young athletes. Most professional leagues are populated with people in their 
mid-twenties (or later), and the success of people age 18-22 in these major sports is 
often very limited. For other athletes, their sport is not played at a professional level in 
the U.S., so the college game is their last opportunity to play at the highest level. Many 
of the smaller sports that are paid professionally do not afford the athletes to make the 
living that they could make by utilizing their college degree, or there are very few 
professional slots for a very high number of potential players. Furthermore, both the 
NBA and NFL have made it against the rules to enter the league directly from high 
school, narrowing the options for the 18 year-old American athlete to do anything other 
than pick their favorite (or the best) school and compete for anywhere from one to four 
years before moving on to professional sports or a career outside of athletics. 
Opportunity Cost for Young Athletes 
 The opportunity cost for an athlete choosing to play in college rather than play 
their sport professionally is higher in 2019 than it has ever been. As professional 
athletes have earned higher salaries across all major sports over the last twenty years, 
the value of a college degree has not escalated at the same rate (while the cost of the 
degree may have increased, the value of the degree is functionally the same). 
  When a top-tier 18 year-old athlete could’ve made $6,000 annually playing 
professional baseball (the minimum in 1968), there was little reason to complain that a 
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player choosing to play collegiately should be compensated. They were sacrificing an 
opportunity cost of only $6,000, while also taking advantage of a free college education. 
As the average salary has now grown to nearly $4 million in the MLB, the opportunity 
cost of collegiate sports has grown too. With this rise in opportunity cost comes louder 
calls for the cost to be offset by some form of player compensation. This greatly 
contributes to the problems that the NCAA is facing today. 
 Clearly, in 2019, the status quo is changing, and will continue to change as calls 
for eighteen- to twenty two-year old star athletes to be paid. Global opportunities for 
players in basketball, baseball, volleyball, and other sports have made a European or 
Asian career viable in a way that it never has been before. Additional football leagues, 
looking to take a slice of the pie that the NFL currently dominates, have begun to pop up 
in the United States and Canada. Minor league basketball, known as the G-League, will 
allow players to enter straight from high school in the fall of 2019,38 and it is expected 
that the NBA will repeal their rule disallowing 18-year-old high school graduates from 
entering the league sometime within the next five years. Esports (or professional 
videogames) leagues have popped up and are populated with young people, and most 
universities have not yet formed even club (non-NCAA, university affiliated) teams. 
With all of these new entrants to the market hoping to capitalize on the stardom and 
athleticism of the most talented high school athletes (and offering them the opportunity 
to make money in a way that would violate the NCAA’s founding principles), it’s time to 
question whether the NCAA will lose its perch as the only option for young athletes. 
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Current Status Quo 
 It is important to remember that, for the sake of this discussion, we are primarily 
talking about the ability of the NCAA to protect amateurism in football and men’s 
basketball (as stated in the introduction, the national debate always centers around 
these two sports, and they are the only two where the athletes sometimes create more 
value for the school than they receive through their scholarship). Each of these two 
American major professional leagues currently operates under different rules—the NFL 
requires players to be three years out of high school, while the NBA requires just one 
year.  
NFL Rules of Eligibility 
 There are a considerable number of issues for the NCAA and student-athletes 
that are caused by the NFL not allowing players to leave for three years. One of these 
issues is illustrated perfectly by star Clemson University quarterback Trevor Lawrence 
who, as a freshman, led his Clemson Tigers to the national championship. Because of 
the NFL’s policy that Lawrence must wait two more full years before being eligible to 
declare for the NFL draft, Lawrence will be risking injury every time he steps on the field 
for the next two years, and is unable to be compensated in a highly competitive league. 
He is the definition of a captive entertainer—the NCAA gets most of the media blame for 
this, but if there were a competitive football league that Lawrence could join at age 
eighteen and play for a salary, much of the heat on the NCAA would dissipate.  
 This has caused a recent phenomenon of star players choosing to sit out the bowl 
game at the end of the season, in order to not get hurt and have their draft stock dip 
before the NFL draft. Many fans find this practice disappointing, but it’s tough to blame 
the athletes—in that one bowl game, they could lose millions of dollars by playing, but 
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have nothing to lose by sitting out. Nick Bosa, a star at Ohio State University, took this 
practice even further, missing more than two-thirds of his last season before NFL 
eligibility. He was met with derision from some fans and even a few members of the 
media, but the national conversation has turned so far on the NCAA that many lauded 
him for his decision.39 
 The other major dilemma caused by the NFL’s rules of eligibility is that a player 
cannot declare for the NFL draft and, if not selected, return for his final year (or two) of 
college eligibility. Lil’Jordan Humphrey, a standout receiver for the University of Texas, 
experienced this problem in the spring of 2019.40 In order for a football player to declare 
for the NFL draft, they must waive their amateur eligibility at the college level. The NBA 
used to have the same issue, but the NBA and NCAA resolved it (to great success). It is 
important that the NCAA make strides with the NFL to fix this problem in the future, so 
that players don’t miss out on opportunity simply because they enter their name in a 
draft. 
The NBA and the One and Done Problem 
 The NBA has shifted their rules around considerably in the past, with different 
legal cases determining when players would be allowed to enter. Some of the greatest 
players of all time (including Earvin “Magic” Johnson and Larry Bird) chose to play 
multiple years in college before going to the NBA—even though this was not required of 
them. In 1995, the common practice changed, and a twenty-year period without anyone 
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entering the league directly from high school ended.41 Over the next ten years, many of 
the best players in the league had entered straight from high school (including Kobe 
Bryant and LeBron James). Beginning in 2005, the NBA changed the rule so that, to 
qualify for the draft, a player must both be nineteen years old in the year of the draft and 
(if they are an American player) have graduated high school at least one year ago.42 In 
that time, the phenomenon of the “one and done” player has grown, indicating a college 
basketball player who plans to only stay one year in collegiate basketball before entering 
the NBA. In 2018, fifteen of the thirty picks in the first round of the NBA draft were “one 
and done” players. 
The Greg Oden Problem 
 In my discussions with certain student-athletes and members of the media, it 
became apparent that many of these “one and done” players in basketball were a 
different brand of student than even the other players on their team. This was most 
aptly illustrated to me by Mark Titus, a former college basketball player and close friend 
of “one and done” player Greg Oden. Oden played for Ohio State in the 2006-2007 
season, before becoming the first overall pick in the NBA draft after just one year. Oden 
was a student just like the rest in the summer and fall of 2006, needing to pass his 
classes in order to be allowed to play for the basketball team. The dynamic was already 
clearly different, however, because the whole world knew that Oden would be leaving 
after just one year at school. Titus described Oden as a “temporarily unpaid 
professional.” Essentially, Oden was spending his one year “working” at Ohio State 
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University. His incentives were to get in better shape, perform at a high level in games 
that were watched by hundreds of NBA scouts, and grow his public image. The 
compensation he received was only in the form of classes (now, in 2019, he would also 
receive his “cost of attendance” stipend, which at Ohio State is less than $3,000 
annually). He would have no immediate use for the entry-level classes that he took (in 
fact, he plans to graduate from Ohio State this May, 13 years after enrolling).43  
 The NCAA wants its players to be “student-athletes”, as evidenced by over a 
decade of advertisements noting, “Almost all of them [the athletes] will go pro in 
something other than sports.” In the case of Oden, he will never be a student in the same 
way that I am a student, because the only reason he is attending a University at all is 
because he (and other stars like him) are not yet allowed to make money and gain 
exposure by playing their sport. The new entrants that we will now discuss at length 
offer players like Oden a better opportunity to do so, and therefore threaten the business 
model of the NCAA. 
New Entrants in Basketball 
 The most viable current example of a new entrant taking away is being seen in 
basketball. There are now (beginning in the fall of 2019) two alternatives that offer elite, 
18-year old basketball players the chance to play against very high levels of competition 
while getting paid. Both of these options have positives and negatives for potential 18 
year-old athletes, but one of the positives for each of these options is the opportunity to 
be compensated. The chance to make money playing basketball to either help support a 
family or start an independent life is very appealing, and for certain young players this 
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outweighs the potential upside offered by college basketball. These alternatives are: (1) 
playing abroad professionally and (2) joining the NBA G-League (or minor league). 
European, Asian, and Australian Leagues  
 The first alternative is to play overseas for a year. As leagues in Europe, Asia, and 
Australia have progressed, so too has the number of young people across the world 
(including American-born basketball players) choosing to play abroad rather than for an 
NCAA member institution. Terrance Ferguson, a highly rated recruit in the Class of 
2016, chose to play in Australia rather than in the NCAA, and made nearly $1 million in 
doing so.44 After his time in Australia, he was able to seamlessly transition to a career in 
the NBA, and has been very vocal about his decision. Terrance is one of many young 
basketball players deciding to play overseas, and is now being followed by even bigger 
“celebrity” names like LaMelo Ball. 
 In the highly publicized event I alluded to earlier that took place in February 
2019, star “one and done” player Zion Williamson stepped through his shoe and injured 
himself. Donovan Mitchell, former NCAA player and current NBA star, tweeted “Again 
let’s remember all the money that went into this game…. And these players get none of 
it…. And now Zion gets hurt… something has to change,” and tagged the official NCAA 
account in his tweet. Luka Doncic, former European basketball star and current NBA 
sensation, playfully responded, “go play in Europe.”45 Comments like these, especially 
between a former NCAA player and a former European league player who are both 
sharing similar NBA success, are the exact comments that lead to young players 
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realizing that, in the global world we now live in, playing in Europe is a completely 
viable option for a young athlete who wants to be paid.  
The NBA G-League 
 In response to incidents like this (and wishing to capitalize more on the value 
that can be created by young superstar players), the NBA is now allowing 18 year old 
players to play in the G-League, a developmental league with NBA affiliate teams, before 
they are eligible for the draft. Their salary is capped at $125,000, and it will be 
interesting to see in the next three- to five-years how many talented young athletes 
decide to play in the G-league rather than for a major college program.46 
 The main drawback to both of these options is that NCAA basketball still provides 
the highest level of exposure to future NBA stars that wish to bump their reputation 
before they enter the league. The G-league is a much lower level, and it will likely take a 
few years before top talent would enter this league (and by then, they’ll likely be allowed 
to go straight to the NBA). As watching foreign games gets easier through streaming 
services like YouTube, the exposure of foreign leagues will continue to grow. Even with 
the slightly lower levels of exposure, the opportunity for a salary and a new experience is 
potentially dangerous to the NCAA’s current stranglehold on almost all 18-year-old 
basketball players. 
 Both of these two alternate options present a major threat to the NCAA and its 
ability to protect amateurism among college athletics. Take Duke University, for 
example, and the nearly $31 million in revenue their basketball program brings in each 
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year.47 This money is allocated throughout the athletic department (and, in the case of 
the most successful schools, the University) helping further both athletic and academic 
pursuits. If Duke consistently loses the best talent to the NBA G-League and overseas 
leagues, they will also lose viewership, merchandise sales, and other sources of revenue. 
In order to continue to achieve their goals of helping maximize the educational 
experience of student athletes (and to all students at certain schools), they want to 
maximize the money their basketball program brings in. Offering 10-15 college athletes 
a contract of $200,000/year in addition to an academic scholarship and cost of living 
stipend would make Duke the most attractive option again, as it had been for decades, 
and there is a compelling argument to be made from Duke’s point-of-view that they 
would make much more than they spent by offering these contracts to the top-rated 
young players—however, they would no longer be amateur athletes. The NCAA would 
never allow this to happen (as I’ve repeatedly stated, it flies in the face of one of their 
main purposes of existence)—but could there potentially be a different way to 
compensate athletes more fairly, without paying them a salary or having a free agency 
system? The NCAA must seek out good alternatives in order to keep illegal payments out 
of the game—or worse, schools leaving the NCAA. 
 If new entrants (like the G-League and overseas leagues) are able to poach all of 
the talent that has traditionally gone to NCAA programs, viewership and revenue will 
follow the athletes. If the major basketball colleges lose this source of revenue, they will 
lose out on revenue to help pay for academic and athletic pursuits at their university. 
Leaving the NCAA, paying the top athletes a salary to play for their schools, and 																																																								
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capitalizing on the increased income would further their institutional goals. In order for 
the NCAA to fight this complete loss of amateurism, it is possible that they may need to 
further adapt their definition and rules to allow for some type of additional 
compensation.  
New Entrants in Football 
 The NFL has historically had such a stranglehold on the professional football 
market that it has been nearly impossible to create and maintain a different league. 
Leagues like the USFL and XFL have tried and failed, and the most recent failure was 
the AAF, which played most of one season in the spring of 2019 before folding. If there 
is a future where young football players are able to go play elsewhere for a salary, a 
league will need to hit on something that the other leagues have failed to hit on. The 
next league that will attempt to successfully join the NFL as a successful professional 
football league is a new iteration of the XFL, which is set to play its first game in the 
early spring of 2020. This is a revival of the original XFL by Vince McMahon, who also 
was in charge of the original league.48 This time, he has brought on Oliver Luck, who has 
considerable experience working within both the NCAA and NFL, as a former NFL 
player and Athletic Director at West Virginia University. Notably, Luck has said that the 
eligibility restrictions are “in development”, not committing to the idea that players 
would have to have the same eligibility requirements as the NFL.49 Allowing athletes to 
come straight from high school could be the piece of the pie that makes the XFL viable, 
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all the while threatening to take away some of the quality of the product of college 
football. 
 There would be advantages and disadvantages to this new league for an athlete. 
First, it would likely turn into almost a minor-league system for the NFL, mirroring the 
G-League rule change that recently took place in basketball. Exposure would likely be 
lower than college football, as XFL teams (just like G-league teams) do not already have 
devoted fan bases and lucrative TV contracts that will bring them national attention. 
Secondly, they will run a higher risk of injury, as they will be playing against older, more 
physically developed men from a younger age. Lastly, salaries are not very high in the 
XFL—there is a tier system that allows a certain number of players per team to make a 
certain amount of money, but no player will make much more than $250,000 in a single 
season, according to a Darren Rovell tweet. If a player runs a higher risk of career 
ending injury for a salary much lower than that which he could receive in the NFL, all 
for less exposure, some athletes may decide that the college system is more fitting for 
them. Of course, there is no guarantee that the XFL will decide to allow players straight 
from high school, but from a business standpoint, it does seem to make sense. 
Esports: How Videogames May Threaten the Status Quo 
 For decades, many people who work in traditional, physical sports have laughed 
at videogames as “not real sports.” I am not here to litigate what constitutes a sport—
what is undeniable is that people playing videogames professionally is at an all time 
high, and the NCAA has lagged behind in setting up their own league. As young people 
across the country and the globe continue to shift their entertainment and leisure 
patterns to esports, the NCAA will have to decide if they intend to charge forward and 
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create an amateur system for college students who wish to play esports, or leave the 
videogames to the professionals. 
The Popularity of Esports  
 Esports exploded in popularity in Asia, but their growth in America has taken off. 
According to the Washington Post50, there are estimates that esports will generate $345 
million in revenue in North America this year. The prize money for winning the biggest 
tournaments in esports has already surpassed that in NASCAR, golf, or cycling. Over ten 
times as many people watched the League of Legends world championship in 2017 than 
watched Wimbledon or the U.S. Open in golf. Among young people, the popularity is 
startling—A Washington Post poll fount that 38% of young Americans say that they are 
fans of esports or competitive gaming—for reference, the NFL was only at 40%. With 
increased fandom will come increased participation, money, and national exposure. 
The Viability of Esports in the NCAA 
 The NCAA didn’t even begin to explore the possibility of esports at the NCAA 
championship level until 2017.51 Unfortunately for amateurism, the specific environment 
of esports may make it impossible for the NCAA to ever find a foothold. The most 
important difference between esports and traditional American sports offered by the 
NCAA is that athletes can be paid from a very young age. In 2015, a 16-year old in 
Pakistan became the youngest esports player to surpass $1 million in career earnings.52 
In football, swimming, volleyball, or most other major sports, it is impossible for a 																																																								
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player to make millions before they turn 18. In esports, it may be the norm for the best 
players, and the NCAA would have no way to compete with those earnings. While not a 
short-term problem for the NCAA, esports could present a long-term challenge if 
current consumption trends continue. 
Overall Threat of New Entrants Disrupting the Current NCAA 
 There are new entrants and changing consumer trends that could absolutely 
harm the short- and long-term position of the NCAA as the prime option for young 
athletes. They are insulated from some of these new entrants by the fact that NCAA 
member institutions have large, built in fan bases that have proven for over a century to 
be highly invested in the success of their teams. However, if new leagues in football and 
basketball are able to successfully convince young athletes that they are better off 
entering a new league than they are joining an NCAA program, the NCAA will have 
failed (in a limited sense) in their goal of preserving the amateur status for the very top 
tier of young athletes. This is already seen in baseball, tennis, soccer, and some other 
sports, where many of the most talented players enter the draft and play in the minor 
leagues (or professionally overseas) directly out of high school. The good news for the 
NCAA is that the number of athletes who would be able to turn professional straight 
from high school is very low in both football and basketball, even if the leagues grow in 
size and exposure, and collegiate programs would certainly be able to fill roster slots 
with other student-athletes. In this way, it is a very limited failure on the part of the 
NCAA, and one that has not hurt them greatly in baseball. New entrants to the market 
are not the only threat to the NCAA—the next threat we will examine is the growing TV 
revenues and how they may be high enough to topple the modified amateurism that the 
NCAA holds dear. 
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Chapter 5 
More Money, More Problems 
 
 In 2019, just about the only valuable live-television property that remains is live 
sporting events. The NCAA conferences and member-institutions know that, and have 
been successfully capitalizing on it for the last few years. Major broadcasting companies 
have been paying huge sums of money to broadcast college games live, and that money 
isn’t always distributed “fairly”. In fact, the inherent inequity of the current division of 
NCAA television revenues poses a major threat to the NCAA, because the major brands 
in college football and basketball stand to benefit from flexing their muscles and leaving 
the NCAA for greener pastures.  
Misaligned Incentives 
 The way to capture the most value for your school through selling the broadcast 
rights to football and basketball games varies considerably between schools of different 
sizes, regions of the country, and football prominence. This idea was partially discussed 
in Chapter 3, but it is important to note again that these programs were not all created 
equal. Schools like Alabama and Texas A&M, with massive alumni bases who love 
football, will rarely (if ever) benefit from splitting revenue evenly. Schools like TCU or 
Vanderbilt, with far fewer living alumni and less of a tradition of football success, rely on 
the money spent to broadcast the bigger programs to be partially allocated to them. 
With the incentive structures for schools of different sizes being diametrically opposed, 
schools wishing to maximize their revenue (and therefore the amount of money that can 
be poured back into their university) often end up negotiating very differently.  
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Individual Schools Capitalizing on Strong Brands 
 There are systems like the NBC deal with Notre Dame, worth a reported $15 
million per year,53 to exclusively broadcast their home football games. This could be 
likened to the highly controversial Longhorn Network, which also pays UT Austin about 
$15 million per year.54 These deals have other incentives for major programs—Texas and 
Notre Dame fans know that they will always be able to watch their team play in football 
(and almost every other sport for Texas), a luxury that many fans do not have. There is a 
recruiting advantage, as young athletes hoping to increase their exposure know that they 
will be broadcast more than their competitors who go to smaller schools. And the large 
payouts allow for things like the Counseling and Mental Health Center on the University 
of Texas campus to exist, providing a hugely valuable service to all students at UT.55  
Conference Negotiations 
 Other forms of revenue are negotiated by the conference. The majority of TV 
revenue for college football programs is dealt by conference arrangements with ESPN, 
Fox, CBS, and other major networks. Deals are put in place for roughly 15 years at a 
time, and the revenue goes 100% to the conference. The conferences then split up 
revenue evenly amongst all schools in that conference. This system is perfect if you are 
Vanderbilt or Maryland, who both recently received paychecks of $4156 and $34 million57 
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from the SEC and Big 10, respectively. However, ESPN and CBS aren’t paying the 
conferences to watch the Vanderbilt or Maryland games—they’re paying to watch 
Michigan, Ohio State, Alabama, LSU, and a select group of others. In fact, some schools 
in the SEC receive massive payouts from the CBS broadcasting rights deal despite not 
playing a game on the network. Vanderbilt has played 6 games on CBS over the last 21 
seasons, but has taken a cut of the SEC/CBS revenues every year.  
Revenue Growth and Renegotiation 
 Not only are TV revenues incredibly high for NCAA member institutions, but they 
are also growing at an exponential rate. Each season, the American public is willing to 
pay more for the ability to cheer for (primarily) major college football, basketball, and 
baseball teams. ESPN now pays $470 million annually for the rights to broadcast the 
College Football Playoff (which is already not governed by the NCAA).58 This money is 
distributed based on a few different factors, including the fact that all ten conferences 
comprised of FBS (Football Bowl Subdivision) teams receiving part of the payout. The 
NCAA brings in over $900 million in revenue from March Madness (the NCAA 
sanctioned college basketball tournament to crown a champion), representing over 90% 
of their annual revenue.59 The rights that ESPN procured in 2011 for all non-football and 
basketball NCAA Championship events were purchased for $500 million over 12 years—
that deal may be worth three to four times what ESPN is actually paying for it.60 
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 After looking through the numbers, it is clear why UT and Notre Dame both 
sought individual deals, because they could capitalize on national interest specifically on 
their own teams, and further the academic and athletic goals of the university with the 
additional revenue. Alabama, University of Southern California, and Florida State 
sharing their TV revenue evenly with South Carolina, Arizona State, and Boston College 
doesn’t make sense in the long-run for the major programs, and with each year of 
growth comes a few million more reasons to change the status quo. Fortunately for 
many of these programs, the TV deals will not be around forever, and the big players will 
have a chance in the coming decade to flex their muscles and try to get the best deal 
possible. The Big 10 rights deal expires in 2022. The SEC deal with CBS expires in 2024, 
as does all of the Pac-12 broadcasting rights. All Big 12 conference-wide deals expire in 
2025. With these expirations comes a huge opportunity for the real revenue drivers of 
the sport to start to maximize on their yearly income. 
Implications for the Future of the NCAA 
 This is where the NCAA’s ability to protect amateurism comes into play. Texas, 
Notre Dame, Alabama, and others all have a very real interest in maximizing this 
revenue, both for their school and for their student-athletes. With more money comes 
more exposure, nicer facilities, bigger bonuses, and, very notably, bigger contributions 
back to the institution. While some may scoff at this, the Counseling and Mental Health 
Center at UT Austin discussed above is the perfect example of college athletics working 
to benefit the University as a whole. With this interest, and the media-savvy people 
working in the athletic departments at the biggest schools, it doesn’t make sense to 
continue splitting revenue with smaller schools.  
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 It has been speculated by the Atlantic61 and other major publications that leaving 
the NCAA and forming a more traditional league, with teams still affiliated with the 
major universities, would best serve major football programs and the universities they 
currently represent. By eliminating the NCAA, conference offices, and small schools 
from the revenue, these programs would massively help their bottom line, without 
sacrificing any marquee matchups that fans and athletes crave. Baked into this split 
from the NCAA would be a desire to recruit 100% of the top talent, and once no longer 
bound by NCAA amateurism rules, these programs could offer salaries or signing 
bonuses to their athletes without breaking any rules. 
 Of course, in the current environment where there is no alternative for football 
players age 18-21 to play football at a high level for money, there would be no reason for 
these schools to pay their players. However, without the legal backing and precedent of 
the NCAA and the formative 1984 ruling (discussed in Chapter 3), and seeing as the 
revenues brought in by this league would be astronomical, it would be very difficult 
legally to keep from paying players. This would only affect the largest schools—maybe 
30 or so—and therefore only about 2,400 athletes, a miniscule number compared to the 
total that the NCAA oversees every year. However, this loss would be a massive cultural 
blow to amateurism in the United States, as college football is by far the most watched 
product of the NCAA. This is a cultural loss that the NCAA must do everything in their 
power to avoid. 
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Potential Steps for the NCAA to Mitigate Risk  
 What are the steps that the NCAA can take to avoid losing their biggest, most 
prominent football programs in the member institution’s effort to maximize the money 
that they can bring in to help their athletic departments and universities? What about 
the same problem in basketball, where TV broadcast rights are over $800 million 
annually? Even the smaller NCAA championships, broadcast by ESPN, are worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars over a decade or less. There are a few different 
approaches that the NCAA should take to realign broadcast rights to keep key 
stakeholders happy.  
 First of all, the NCAA should consider making it as easy as possible for the biggest 
programs to maximize their revenues under the current administration. While they 
exhibit no control over the College Football Playoff System, it could be beneficial to try 
to negotiate that the payoffs be weighted more towards the bigger and more successful 
football programs. This attitude would be in direct contradiction with the goal set forth 
by the Supreme Court in 1984 to “preserve the character and quality of the game”, and 
would only increase the disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots” of college 
football. However, the NCAA can try to make this change happen on its own terms, or it 
can risk losing the biggest programs altogether. 
 Secondly, and as was discussed in Chapter 4, the relationship between the NCAA 
and the NFL is not as strong as that between the NCAA and the NBA. If that relationship 
could be strengthened, the NFL is one of few institutions with the requisite influence to 
keep NCAA member institutions interested in staying with the NCAA. The NFL likely 
has no interest in losing out on its (near 100%) share of the professional football market, 
and a league of paid players that are tied to different universities could prevent an even 
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bigger risk than the XFL or AAF ever could. Perks like allowing NCAA students who 
enter the draft and remain unselected to return to complete their eligibility would be a 
simple change that could go a long way in helping protect the NCAA from this potential 
exodus. 
 Lastly, the NCAA could take an active role in helping the negotiations for new 
television broadcast deals as they all expire over the next six years. If the NCAA can 
potentially incentivize new deals to be signed quickly and collectively by the same 
conferences, they likely buy themselves at least another decade of the modified 
amateurism that they currently protect. The NCAA must focus on the Big 10 and SEC, 
which will be renegotiating their deals first (and will also command the highest 
valuation). If the NCAA can survive while those two behemoth conferences negotiate 
their next TV deals, it is almost certain that they won’t have any problem with losing 
major programs due to broadcast revenues in the near future. 
Overall Risk Factor to the NCAA 
 While it may seem far-fetched, the growth rate of TV revenues for all collegiate 
sports (primarily football and basketball) presents a major threat to the ability of the 
NCAA to keep student-athletes amateur. When major programs decide that they want to 
fight to maximize the revenue coming back to Austin, Ann Arbor, or Tuscaloosa, they 
will likely find that splitting off from the NCAA is the best option to maximize profits, 
and after splitting would not be held to the same rules as they have been for over a 
century. The same could happen with collegiate basketball programs, hoping to 
capitalize on the nearly $1 billion generated in three weeks alone by the championship 
tournament.  
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 The NCAA must be vigilant in fighting to keep these large institutions from 
leaving and forming their own separate leagues, even if that means catering certain 
agreements to benefit the largest revenue drivers across different sports. Because there 
would be such a high degree of coordination between athletic departments that rarely 
interact, it would not be the easiest task for the largest programs to split off. Different 
actions taken over the next five years by the NCAA can greatly mitigate the risk, and 
even locking in a couple of the major conferences quickly could have the effect of 
maintaining the status quo for decades to come. The next area of importance for the 
NCAA to consider is the societal pressure, specifically surrounding the players being 
compensated for their likeness. 
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Chapter 6 
Owning Your Likeness 
 
 Ed O’Bannon was a basketball player at UCLA in the 1990s. His team won the 
1995 NCAA Championship, and O’Bannon was named the Most Outstanding Player of 
the tournament. The team was considered to be so good that you could select to play as 
the 1995 UCLA Bruins on the NCAA March Madness videogame that came out well over 
a decade later.62 The NCAA and Electronic Arts (EA) expected that many fans would 
want to play as the legendary O’Bannon when trying to win the virtual championship. 
What the NCAA didn’t realize is that O’Bannon saw their licensing his likeness as an 
opportunity to challenge the NCAA on their ability to use a player’s image without giving 
him or her any compensation, and the lawsuit that he filed helped put in motion a 
movement that has the potential to change the NCAA’s definition of amateurism.63 
Background of the Lawsuit  
 In 2009, Ed O’Bannon brought a class action antitrust suit against the NCAA. He 
alleged that the NCAA “unreasonably restricted competition by fixing the players’ 
income at ‘zero’ for the use of their names and likenesses.” O’Bannon’s goal was to give 
student-athletes the right to pursue compensation for the fame that they had accrued 
while playing college athletics.64 After all, O’Bannon (and many athletes before and after 
him) have become cultural superstars worth millions of dollars for the fame that gained 
while playing college sports. Johnny Manziel became Johnny Football. Vince Young and 
Zion Williamson were both household names while they were in college. NCAA women’s 																																																								
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basketball players Brittany Griner and Maya Moore were both incredibly famous while 
they were still in college, but were unable to profit from their likenesses.  
 The defense of the NCAA rested on its foundation, for over one hundred years, as 
a regulator of amateur athletics. Any restrictions placed on student-athletes was to 
preserve the key difference between a college athlete and a professional one, and the 
1984 precedent discussed in Chapter 3 was absolutely monumental to the defense. The 
NCAA was simply seeking to protect the “character and quality of the product” by 
disallowing a student-athlete like O’Bannon to profit off of his likeness, and allowing 
students to profit in this way would fundamentally change the way college athletes are 
viewed. What the NCAA wasn’t mentioning is that it changes the nature of college 
athletes no more than a full athletic scholarship does. 
 In the end, not much has come from the lawsuit—yet. Electronic Arts was forced 
to stop producing the NCAA videogames that consumers loved so much. O’Bannon and 
thousands of other former college athletes reached a settlement of $60 million with 
Electronic Arts, mostly receiving small checks in the mail compensating them for their 
likeness being used in videogames throughout the years.65 O’Bannon won in a lower 
court, and Judge Claudia Wilken noted that the NCAA seemed to be very inconsistent 
with their application of the word “amateur” (a fact that many had known for decades, 
and is noted throughout this thesis). The case made its way up to higher and higher 
courts, and eventually O’Bannon’s central thesis that “certain NCAA amateurism rules 
violate federal antitrust law” was ruled to be correct by the Ninth Circuit before the 
Supreme Court declined to review the case. The 9th Circuit did limit this statement by 
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saying the member schools only needed to provide “up to the cost of attendance”. As 
discussed throughout this paper, that change was already in the works, and the cost-of-
attendance stipend is now a reality. The lasting impact of the O’Bannon case, however, is 
yet to be seen, as many in the media have seen the precedent set by the Ninth Circuit 
that “certain NCAA amateurism rules violate federal antitrust law” could soon mean that 
players can be compensated for their likeness. The ruling also spelled trouble for the 
NCAA and its 1,200 member colleges, who are “participating in an anti-competitive 
conspiracy… to deny men’s basketball and football players of the monetary value of their 
names, images, and likenesses.”66 Activists who wish to improve the lives of these college 
football and basketball players hope to use this precedent to soon allow players to be 
compensated more fairly. 
Cultural Motivations Behind Paying Collegiate Athletes 
 It has become very trendy to crusade against the NCAA in the media. Whether it 
is in blogs, on Twitter, or even on TV, many people find making fun of the NCAA (or 
downright criticizing it) is a way to obtain favor with young fans. Pat McAfee, former 
NCAA and NFL athlete, had 110,000 people view his video on Twitter that he captioned 
“Daily reminder that you should hate the NCAA”.67 LeBron James said that the NCAA 
was “corrupt” shortly after NBA coach Steve Van Gundy said that it is “one of the worst 
organizations—if not the worst organization— in sports.”68 Jay Bilas, an NCAA basketball 
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analyst for ESPN, has been a longtime (and very vocal) critic, saying, “The idea that the 
free market works for the entire world, save the athletes, is ludicrous to me.”69 
 Many of these critics are former athletes themselves, and others are constantly 
surrounded by them. They see the value that they create for universities, and wonder 
why all of the money goes to the (predominantly) old white men in the athletic 
department and coaching booth, while all that the (predominantly) young black men get 
is a scholarship worth far less than the value they create?  The optics certainly aren’t 
good, and the fact that the highest paid public employees in many southern states is the 
head football coach at the biggest university is regrettable, especially when his players 
aren’t even allowed to sign their own picture. While it won’t end the debate, allowing 
players to be compensated for their likeness could help improve the public opinion of 
the NCAA without ruining collegiate athletics. 
What is a Likeness? 
 There are dozens of ways that famous athletes could profit off of their own 
likeness, and there is a strong argument to be made that this doesn’t make them any less 
of an amateur than a full athletic scholarship does. The way that it manifested itself 
most publicly was the videogame, but this would be far from the biggest way student-
athletes made money if they were allowed to profit off of their likeness. Trevor Lawrence 
could sell autographed pictures of himself (some other college athletes already do so 
illegally, at great cost to themselves if they are caught). Zion Williamson could sign a 
shoe deal with Nike, and could wear the new “Zion 1” shoe while playing for Duke—all 
the while profiting off of the millions of kids who would flock to buy these shoes. 
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Defensive linemen or benchwarming basketball players could make money by becoming 
social media celebrities and marketing different products for companies. Baylor 
University could sell jerseys with Brittany Griner’s name on the back, and both could 
profit. While this does represent a major positive change in the lives of student-athletes, 
it doesn’t change their relationship with their sport or their school any more than the 
awarding of a scholarship does.  
Advantages to Allowing Players to Profit Off Their Own Likeness 
 There are several advantages to a system that allows players to be compensated 
for their likeness. First, their payment is market-driven, and would still affect a 
relatively small percentage of student-athletes. For example, there are only so many 
players on a college basketball team who would become famous enough to reap large 
profits from their likeness. The majority of teams wouldn’t have any stars that made a 
national impact, and those that did already recruit the best talent and usually lose their 
players after a year (like Duke). People like star Duke basketball player Wendell Carter’s 
mom, who said that the NCAA was “like slavery”70 as her son finished his one year in 
college, would be at least partially appeased by his ability to profit from his already 
valuable likeness.  
 Secondly, this system is already partially in place, and the universities and 
conferences are blatantly treating their athletes unfairly. Take Malik Jefferson, former 
UT football star. Malik wore the uncommon jersey number 46, and was the most iconic 
player on a Texas team in a transition period. That year, Nike and the University of 
Texas sold only one jersey through the store—a jersey with the number 46, without a 																																																								
70 Berkowitz, Steve. “Mom of Duke's Wendell Carter Says NCAA System Resembles 'Slavery and the Prison System'.” USA Today, 
Gannett Satellite Information Network, 7 May 2018, www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2018/05/07/ncaa-like-slavery-prison-
system-knight-commission-kylia-carter/587519002/. 
 
	 59	
name (this, of course, would be illegal). Schools across the country do this every year, 
sneakily profiting off of selling something as close to a player’s likeness as legally 
allowed. Nearly a decade after Johnny Manziel took the college football world by storm, 
Texas A&M is still making money off of #2 jerseys sold to toddlers. This is deliberately 
circumventing the rules, and criticism of practices like these is completely warranted. 
 Third, allowing the players to profit off of their own likeness should only “grow 
the pie”—that is to say, increase the amount of money people spend on college athletics, 
and therefore not destroy any value for the NCAA or its member institutions. Throwing 
the name “Ehlinger” on the back of a Burnt Orange #11 Texas jersey should only 
increase its sales, and allow both Sam and the university to profit. Relicensing the 
videogames and dispensing part of the profits to student-athletes featured in the game 
seems to be a win for consumers, a win for videogame developers, and a win for student-
athletes. Allowing Zion Williamson or other famous basketball players allows them to 
grow their personal brand, without diminishing the quality of college basketball or the 
support that Duke is able to receive from the profits generated by its world-famous 
basketball team. These advantages make a compelling case for players to be allowed to 
profit off of their likeness, and many in the media have started to make the case. 
Disadvantages of Allowing Players to Profit Off Their Own Likeness 
 There are a few fair concerns that could be raised by this proposal—most 
importantly, the notion that, if unregulated, it could irreparably alter the competitive 
landscape of college athletics. There are two main ways that this could occur. 
 First, the biggest and best programs in each of the major sports already have an 
advantage in recruiting, but this advantage would skyrocket if student-athletes had an 
unlimited ability to profit off of their own likeness. The recruiting pitch is easy to 
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understand: “Come play at Alabama or Duke, and you will become a celebrity without 
even trying. You’ll make way more money than your peers.” Schools that have the most 
national exposure would go from attracting most of the best talent to attracting all of the 
best talent, as students hoping to profit more would go to the schools that gave them the 
best chance to do so. While the competitive balance is certainly already skewed in 
almost every collegiate sport, the problem would only be exacerbated if the NCAA 
allowed this compensation. 
 Secondly, illegal practices would surely immediately be put into place, and would 
be very difficult for the NCAA or its member institutions to regulate against. As 
discussed throughout this paper, alumni and fans of different college teams have proven 
for well over a century that they are willing to break the rules and spend considerable 
amount of money to ensure that their college team wins games. In a world with an 
unlimited cap on a student-athlete’s ability to profit off of their own likeness, a situation 
like the following would occur with dizzying frequency: a player like Zion Williamson is 
being recruited out of high school. A North Carolina booster approaches him at a high 
school game and notes that, if he decides to attend UNC, he can guarantee that he’ll buy  
$100,000 in autographed pictures of Zion. A Duke booster overhears the conversation, 
and later contests that he would buy $110,000 in Zion Williamson t-shirts, and make 
sure that Zion made more money at Duke than he ever could at UNC. The same system 
could happen at the biggest schools with the most rabid fans every year, and then the 
NCAA would have devolved into something that is no different from the free agency 
system. This is a scenario that would absolutely fundamentally change the nature of 
amateurism at the college level, and the NCAA would not allow this to happen. Both of 
these examples of what could go wrong with a likeness compensation system can be 
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prevented with a “cap”. The implementation of any likeness compensation system in 
college sports would require stringent regulation to prevent certain boosters from taking 
advantage of the new arrangement. Potential regulations will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
What The NCAA May Argue—and Why They Are Wrong 
 At this point, we have nearly a decade of examples of the NCAA arguing that 
players should not be compensated for their likeness, and it all revolves around the 
Supreme Court precedent mentioned throughout the thesis that players must not be 
paid in order to protect the “character and quality of the product”. The same argument 
was not used when the NCAA decided that a full “cost of attendance” stipend was fair 
and necessary for all student-athletes just four years ago, and the selective use of 
precedent is exactly what Judge Claudia Wilken noted in her original decision on the 
O’Bannon case. If the stipends and the scholarship do not affect the character and 
quality of the product, then the goal of both the NCAA and those who advocate for 
further compensation of college athletes should be to reach a compromise with a 
solution that resembles the scholarship and the stipend. The NCAA is unlikely to 
improve their status in the court of public opinion if they refuse to allow some form of 
additional compensation. The advocates for student-athletes are unlikely to reach their 
goals of improved compensation if they demand uncapped earnings for all players based 
solely on what the market demands. Both sides could work together to reach their goals. 
A Reasonable Compromise 
 A compromise could be devised so that players could profit off of their likeness 
with certain restrictions that prevent it from resembling the free agent markets and 
multi-million dollar salaries of professional sports. Designing that compromise would 
be incredibly complicated for the NCAA, but there is hope. As discussed throughout 
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Chapter 3, the NCAA has responded in the past to cultural concerns about the 
mistreatment of its student-athletes. It has been most effective, historically, when it’s 
goal has been improving the lives of the student-athletes, and not simply caving to 
societal pressures or trying to curb the illegal behavior of boosters. There are a few ways 
to design such a system that would allow for a more market-based, fair system of 
compensation for student-athletes. Again, note that these solutions apply 
predominantly to collegiate football and basketball players, who are “captive 
entertainers” in that their best current option is to spend at least some time as collegiate 
amateurs. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Conclusion of Thesis Question and Restatement of Thesis 
 To begin this project, I set out to answer the following question: considering the 
environment of college athletics in 2018, particularly the revenues brought in by major 
collegiate football and basketball programs and the increasing availability of other 
options for young athletes, is the NCAA well equipped to protect the amateur nature of 
college athletics or is there an impending change coming? This question was the wrong 
one to ask, which became apparent to me early in the process of researching my topic. 
The answer, to the best of my estimation, is that both of these are true. The NCAA, 
which set out in 1906 to protect both the physical safety and the amateur status of the 
collegiate student-athlete, has successfully modified its definition twice over the course 
of the last 113 years. I believe that an impending change is both necessary and overly 
possible, if not probable. That change is the adoption of a plan that allows student-
athletes to be compensated for their likeness up to a fair point, and my evidence for 
believing that the NCAA will adopt this change stems from a thoroughly researched 
understanding of the history of both amateurism and the NCAA, as well as the most 
pressing issues currently threatening the long-term viability of the NCAA. If the NCAA 
can make this change, it will have maintained a status of modified amateurism among 
college athletes while still compensating players more fairly for the value that they 
create.  
 Through these conclusions and recommendations, I hope to illustrate a few 
possible methods of determining an appropriate “cap” for a student-athlete to profit off 
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of their likeness, as well as pose future questions to the reader about different areas that 
could affect the NCAA in the near future. 
Recommendations: Potential Structure for Likeness Compensation 
 There are a few different ways that the NCAA could go about setting caps for the 
compensation that a student could receive for their likeness. Regardless, I believe that 
an important element of the regulation must be that each individual buyer of a licensed 
product is capped at a certain amount, similar to a cap on individual campaign 
contributions. This helps mitigate the risk of a booster recruiting an entire football team 
by making sure that they all max out their allotted cap for likeness compensation. 
Low Uniform Cap Across All Sports 
 The first, and most simple option is to set a low cap, the same across all sports. 
This would operate similarly to the cost of attendance stipend, and would allow players 
to be compensated for sales of the NCAA videogame or a team poster, for example. The 
problem with this is that the solution is too small—nobody would feel that enough was 
done to help even the playing field between the departments making all of the money 
and the athletes doing most of the value creation. 
Different Caps for Different Sports 
 College football and basketball are the biggest moneymakers in college athletics, 
and the athletes that play these sports create the most value for their schools. They also 
attain the most notoriety, meaning that, in a purely open market, they would command 
the most. One potential solution would be to set caps for each sport, primarily based on 
a combination of the demand for athletes in that sport as well as the athletes earning 
potential if they were not an amateur athlete. In most of the more minor sports, the cap 
would likely be in the $10-$20,000 range, and very few individuals would reach it. 
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Determining a Fair Cap: Football 
 This is the most difficult exercise in determining a fair cap, because there is no 
direct substitute at this time. Looking at the proposed salary structure of the XFL 
alongside the CFL and NFL is unhelpful, due to the massive discrepancy between the 
amounts. The easiest way to set a reasonable cap on football players is to compare the 
value created by the football team compared to the basketball team. On average, football 
brings in four times the revenue across all Division I schools.71 I therefore suggest a cap 
of four times the $125,000 cap that I determined for basketball (see below) for a total of 
$500,000 as a cap. This is about $100,000 less than a late-round NFL draft pick would 
make annually over the course of their four-year rookie contract, so this cap still puts 
them below NFL players.72 I decided to use the revenue brought in by the entire football 
team, rather than the individual football player, because football rosters are so big that 
the cap for the football players would be considerably lower than that which I 
determined for basketball players. Because the top tier of football players creates much 
more value, their cap should not be lower. In a world where buyers are restricted to 
buying things only for themselves and their families, it is unlikely that many players 
would hit this cap. 
Determining a Fair Cap: Basketball 
 A fair cap is slightly easier to determine in basketball, considering the availability 
of close substitutes. For the next few years, the basketball likeness compensation cap 
could be set at $125,000, or the same as a salary in the G-League. Let us use an example 
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of three different athletes. A top-tier athlete who chooses to go to the G-league would 
make that $125,000 in salary, and could also begin making money off of his likeness. A 
top-tier athlete who chooses the NCAA would be able to make up to the same amount of 
money as the G-league salary, while also getting to experience college, attend classes, 
and gain more national exposure than the G-league player. A middle tier college athlete 
(the fourth or fifth starter on a basketball team) may make an additional $7,000 over his 
scholarship and cost of attendance stipend, through videogame and jersey sales. This 
cap is no more difficult to define when the NBA allows players to enter straight into the 
NBA from high school—NCAA basketball will not be able to compete with these salaries 
reasonably, and there are a very small amount of players who will be able to make the 
jump immediately. 
High Uniform Cap Across All Sports 
 The logic behind this option is very simple—minimum restrictions will allow 
players to be compensated at the closest to their fair value. If a certain swimmer or 
tennis player’s likeness happens to have the same value as the best quarterback in 
college football, there is no good reason to prevent that. It is likely that it would happen 
very rarely, but in a special case, there is an argument that players of smaller sports 
shouldn’t have a lower cap just because their sport brings in less money. This plan 
would call for a uniform cap, comparable to the football cap described above, for all 
NCAA athletes, and assumes that the vast majority of college athletes would see no 
change in their compensation compared to the “Low Uniform Cap” plan listed above. 
What About the Rest? 
 No matter what the cap, it is likely that some players will exceed it. There are a 
few different creative ways that the NCAA could spend this money. My favorite option is 
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to take an option out of the University of Texas’s book, and funnel all of the money into 
on-campus mental health resources for students of the University that the athlete 
attends. The student-athlete would be fairly given recognition, and the students of the 
University would benefit from the rare athlete who exceeds the cap, rather than the 
athletic department. This seems like the rare opportunity for the NCAA to create a policy 
that isn’t immediately met with virulent derision.  
Reiteration of Important Takeaways 
“Amateurism” is Fluid 
 Amateurism is not as old as many people think that it is. In fact, the idea is less 
than two hundred years old, and was originally used to keep poor people from being 
allowed to play sports in the same category as rich people. The Olympics and the NCAA 
co-opted the word, and there is reasonable debate as to whether they did so to keep the 
game fair or just to keep the lower class out. Fifty years into the existence of the NCAA, 
they changed the meaning of the word fundamentally, allowing players to be 
compensated with the value of a college degree. The definition again changed in 2015 
with a full “cost of attendance” stipend, and the Olympics decided to detach themselves 
completely from the word over thirty years ago. In 2019, the word “amateur” 
functionally means whatever the NCAA says that it means—which gives them the 
authority to change it as they see fit. 
The History of the NCAA Drives the Future  
 The NCAA was founded with the safety of college football players in mind, and it 
operates best when it is working to protect young athletes. The NCAA has shown a 
propensity to change as the culture calls for it, albeit slower than some people may wish. 
Different legal precedent set throughout the years strongly influences the way that the 
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NCAA behaves in 2019, but this doesn’t mean that the NCAA behaves without 
inconsistencies. 
Main Threats to the Viability of the NCAA 
 While there are many threats to the status of the amateur collegiate athlete, two 
of the biggest are:  
 1.the possibility (and increasing reality) of new entrants into the market 
 competing for 18 to 22 year old athletes, and  
 2. the potential for major institutions to leave the NCAA in search of more  money 
for their athletic and academic programs.  
 Both of these threats have been brought to the forefront of the NCAA’s concerns 
because of the amount of money available to successful sports leagues. Revenues coming 
from broadcasting rights, ticket sales, merchandise, and other related business have 
grown consistently since the founding of the NCAA, and the fact that it has taken this 
long for some of these problems to arise is in part due to the love clearly exhibited by the 
general public for collegiate athletics. The next ten years will present major 
opportunities for the NCAA to either strengthen or weaken their position as a protector 
of amateurism by responding to these two threats, and if they are unable to succeed, the 
landscape of both collegiate and amateur athletics could look vastly different in 2030 
than it will in 2020. 
Additional Threats to the NCAA 
 One reason the NCAA may struggle in adjusting to these two specific threats is 
because they are of less immediate concern right now that many other issues plaguing 
the organization. An almost constant barrage of lawsuits have been filed against the 
NCAA over the last decade, ranging many issues—players at Northwestern wanting to 
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unionize, college football players with lasting damage from concussions suffered while 
playing NCAA sports (primarily football), and others. The conclusion of the O’Bannon 
case saw Electronic Arts (EA) pay an average of $1,200 to 29,000 student-athletes, 
whose likenesses had been used in the videogames for profit (without compensation). 
Because they have had to focus on these smaller, less “existential” and forward-facing 
problems, it is unlikely that the NCAA has been able to devote resources towards solving 
these upcoming problems. Their ability to do so is vital to their existence, and it seems 
that their existence is the only societal structure that we have left protecting 
amateurism. Mark Emmert and his colleagues must divert some of their resources and 
best people to these problems, as well as identify other potential threats, if the NCAA is 
to protect amateurism as successfully as they have to this point. 
Ed O’Bannon and New Precedent 
 Ed O’Bannon opened a can of worms when he filed a class action lawsuit against 
the NCAA. Amateur athletes being able to profit off of their own likeness is the exact 
type of moderate step that the NCAA could legislate into existence, and the highest court 
that the case reached agreed with O’Bannon that the NCAA is currently behaving as a 
conspiracy to deny athletes their right to a fair compensation. When the Supreme Court 
hears a case regarding the same issue, it will be incredibly important to see whether they 
agree with their own decision, made in 1984, that student-athletes must not be paid in 
order to preserve the character and quality of the product. 
Relevant Unanswered Questions 
 I think that the most pressing question that the NCAA will have to address over 
the next half-century is how to deal with the victims of concussions playing NCAA 
sports, particularly football and soccer. As the research continues to point towards the 
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negative effects of concussions being far more extreme than we ever thought before, the 
NCAA and the NFL both run a high risk of lawsuit unless there are major rule changes 
to the game. Life can be so cyclical—114 years ago, Theodore Roosevelt called a meeting 
that would lead to the founding of a group whose stated purpose was to keep college 
football players from dying. Over a century later, after the public thought that the 
problem had been solved, new evidence suggests we simply delayed the result. 
 A second relevant question is how the NCAA will adapt to changing consumer 
preferences of how fans consume sporting events. In the age of high definition television 
and every game available anywhere (live), the fear of the NCAA in 1984 that fans would 
stop coming to games is starting to come true. Will the NCAA work to keep fans 
interested in attending games in person, or will crowd sizes continue to shrink? If in-
person crowds do shrink, will the NCAA be able to replace the lost revenue?  
What Does the Future Hold? 
 “One who participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and 
the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits directly derived therefrom.” If one were 
to hold the NCAA to that definition of amateurism, the NCAA is not close to protecting 
it—nor have they been for over 60 years. But, if the NCAA is able to continue to evolve 
and update their definition as they have done in the past, they can maintain the same 
level (or very close) of amateurism that we have now in college athletics. If they don’t, 
they run a high risk of both athletes and institutions leaving the NCAA, in search of 
more money elsewhere.  
Adaptation 
 I expect that the NCAA will adapt in order to survive, whether that happens in 
five, ten, fifteen years. The most likely way I expect that to manifest itself is through 
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allowing players to be compensated for their likeness, to a reasonable point that will 
steadily grow throughout the years. I also expect that competitors to the NCAA, like 
international leagues, minor developmental leagues, and secondary professional football 
leagues all have a good chance of developing further. I expect that television rights will 
continue to become more and more valuable, and as young consumers of media move 
further and further away from the traditional cable package, that individual schools will 
sell the broadcast rights to their games directly to their fans. 
Esports 
 The incredibly fast pace of innovation within esports, the countercultural attitude 
surrounding esports, and the young age of successful esports players all lead me to 
believe that the NCAA will struggle mightily in establishing a successful amateur league 
for esports. I also expect that they will continue to grow in popularity considerably in the 
U.S., but they will be resigned to intramural competitions or club teams between 
different colleges. The NCAA is likely to regret being so late to the game on esports, but I 
don’t believe there is much that could’ve been accomplished in the way of esports. 
Public Perception 
 Through this project, I’ve come to accept the notion that many people simply love 
to hate the NCAA. I do not expect that the public perception of the NCAA will ever be 
positive—the best they can hope for is a lighter shade of negative. “Commercialism in 
college athletics must be diminished and college sport must rise.” This quote could’ve 
come from 2019, but it was written in 1929. The NCAA has existed—and continued to 
both modify and champion amateurism—through 113 years of criticism, and I’m betting 
they’ll be able to continue to do the same.  
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